Introduction
In what are practically the opening lines of her magnum opus, Hannah Arendt makes a bold, yet apt, prediction about the future of the human condition: directed last tie through which even man belongs among the children of nature. It is the same desire to escape from imprisonment to the earth that is manifest in the attempt to create life in the test tube, in the desire…to produce superior human beings and to alter Given the current interest in such contentious bioethical issues as reproductive cloning and genetic enhancement, one would have about the advent of a biotechnological revolution would have attracted substantial attention. However, few have taken serious interest in this intriguing remark. This a prominent question in many current bioethical and politicoquestion of biotechnology could, in turn, offer new insight into her beginning of , "may be the central category of make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possess the ) Thus, if the human capacity to act is ontologically rooted in the biological fact of being born, then it seems that prenatal technological intervention in the genetic endowment of a human being entails a free acting agent. It is hardly surprising, then, that the few authors who do ity. 2 about the possible effects of such technological developments on the human capacity to initiate new beginnings, it is far from obvious that her concept of natality lends itself so readily to arguments that oppose genetic intervention en Habermas and Michael Sandel seem to believe. While she indeed sees in the desire to redesign our biogenetic ssarily mea condition. In fact, it may even be surmised that the opposite is true, and that she develops the concept of natality precisely in response to this looming possibility. Moreover, Habermas invokes the condition of natality to argue that, for human freedom to be retained, it is essential that our biogenetic properties must remain outside the to argue that human freedom is grounded in something that is given by necessity? Indeed, readers of Arendt have always been puzzled by the fact that, while she assumes a sharp opposition between the realms of necessity and freedom, she argues that the capacity to act freely is rooted in the biological fact of birth. In the following, it will be argued that this apparent contradiction can only be removed if we recognize that natality is a concept that undermines the blunt opposition between and bios, biological birth and politico-linguistic bir rman anthropologist Arnold Gehlen in , it will be suggested that the key to this enigma can be found in what is known in evolutionary biology as the phenomenon of neoteny or fetalization. As a result, it will be argued that Habermas and Sandel are mistaken to base their arguments against genetic intervention in
The Techno-Human Condition
Denktagebuch (Thou ), dated early instead began to focus on the basic components of the vita activa, was that she became increasingly occupied with the question of the impact of impending technological developments on the human condition:
ible danger for human thought is that what we once believed to be true could be shattered by the discovery of a fact that was previmaking humans immortal, then everything we had ever thought concerning death and its profundity would become simply laughin that this is simply too high a price to pay for the removal of death. 3 for the astonishing fact that a growing number of researchers in , (Fall/Automne ) possible, at least in principle, to download consciousness onto a hard drive, granting virtual immortality to the individual mind. 4 Hence, when Arendt says of sciencealready decided to no longer take for granted the commonly acceptepared to follow even the most speculative of paths. In what follows, it will be suggested that we ought to read as an attempt to describe, in rigorous phenomenological fashion, the three most fundamental human capacities, which Arendt thought were on the verge of being swept away by technological change. From this perspective, the book may be read as an analysis of the historicointellectual genesis of technoscience and its possible impact on "those general human capacities which grow out of the human condition and are permanent, that is, which cannot be irretrievably lost
The three fundamental human capacities (labour, work, and action) correspond to the most general human conditions, "birth and ion of a -span far beyond the hundredfate of the condition of natality in an increasingly technologically itutes "the central category of political, as distinguished from metaanalytic of Dasein. 5 why the event of birth holds such a prominent place in her thought is certainly not wrong, it also misses the sense of historical urgency that prompted Arendt to write a phenomenology of the active life. If action, the most political of human capacities, is rooted in the fact of i- There is no question that this kind of threat to the essence of the political is unprecedented. Nevertheless, Arendt submits that, when viewed from a broader perspective, the age of biotechnology actually represents but one episode in a much longer history of the decline of the political. Indeed, another important thread that runs through The is the eclipse of the political, as the phenomenological structure informing the capacity to act is perpetually misunderstood from the times of the ancient Greek polis to the present day world. Arendt concludes the book by arguing that everything is not lost, however, because, as she suggests in the very last section, "the uaour capacity to introduce unpredictability in the world whose results are not yet knowable. Hence, while writing "at the very moment when [the nature of society] was overnot venture to make a prediction about how the human capacity to act will fare in the dawning age of pervasive biotechnology.
Although the biotechnological threshold had already been crossed with the introduction of in vitro ething which Arendt pred the attention it deserves. In The Future of Human Nature, Habermas strongly opposes non-therapeutic genetic intervention. He even goes as far as to suggest that it should be legally banned on the basis of a and what has come into being by , seems categorical. It is only because we are aware that an essential aspect of our identity e uniquely responsible:
What is suggested by [the concept of natality] is, I believe, the onset, with birth, of a differentiation between the socialization fate of a person and the natural fate of her organism. It is only by referring to this difference between nature and culture, between beginnings not at our own disposal, and the plasticity of historical practices that the acting subject may proceed to the selfascriptions without which he could not perceive himself as the initiator of his actions and aspirations…. The fact that this natural fate, this past before our past, so to speak, is not at our human disposal seems to be essential for our awareness of freedom.
Habermas acknowledges that it does not necessarily follow from scription of the condition of natality that a genetically as constitutive of new beginnings, but he gives an additional reason why, nonetheless, this will likely be the case. Unlike someone who her parents to act upon her natural talents given at birth, a programmed person can only interpret, but not revise or undo, her makeup. According to Habermas, genetic intervention will establish a patercharacter of human powers and achievements, and misses the part of freedom Against an earlier essay 7 be possible to emancipate oneself from this inferior, programmed position.
However, as compelling as these arguments against the ethical permissibility of biotechnological intervention may be, there nevertheless appears to be something counterintuitive in the contention that genetic intervention will reduce, or even annul, human freedom because it would turn a hitherto chance event into a matter of delibretain their freedom and autonomy by leaving the distribution of their genetic dispositions to the contingent processes of nature: "[According to Habermas] autonomy can only be maintained by prohibiting access to the blind natural contingency that determines us, that is, ultimately, by limiting our autonomy and freedom of 8 Moreover, the argument that human beings not at their disposal is persuasive only if this gifted aspect of human ability is out of their reach. If this is not the case, then Habermas is actually arguing that the only way for human beings to maintain their sense of dignity and autonomy is by committing themselves to an illusion.
Natality Between Necessity and Freedom
will inaugurate the realm of freedom, Arendt writes:
arely occur in second-rate writers, in whom they can be discounted. In the work of great authors they lead into the very center of their work and are the most important clue to a true understanding of their problems and new insights. Thus, if it is true that the real originality of great authors reveals itself especially in the contradictions in their work, then one cannot claim to have really understood the thought of Arendt, or claim that it contains an argument against biogenetic intervention, unless the meaning and sense of the concept of natality has been completely , names the fact that "[b]ecause they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted imaintains that it is through the activity of labour, not action, that men deal with the biological processes forced upon them by necessity? In other words, how can Arendt claim both that political freedom is rooted in such a plain biological phenomenon as parturition and that everything related to "the life of the individual and the survival -It is indeed striking that Arendt is not always consistent in her description of the nature of and the relation between the activities pertaining to the realms of necessity and freedom respectively. In the , she adheres to the ancient Greek view of separating the private and the public realm, oikos and polis, even to the point of endorsing the Greek idea that it is legitimate to use violence in the private sphere, provided that it serves the purpose of liberating "oneself from the necessity of life for the freedom 10 , as Seyla Benhabib has called her one-to-one coupling of human activities and worldly locations, seems to lead her to accept the Attic view that we are all born as unequal, needy creatures, irredeemably tied to the necessities of the life process, but that we are nevertheless intermittently capable of raising ourselves out of this slavish condiwants and needs can be temporarily suppressed. As Arendt notes:
The distinctive trait of the household sphere was that in it men lived together because they were driven by their wants and needs…. The realm of the polis, on the contrary, was the sphere of freedom, and if there was a relationship between these two spheres, it was a matter of course that the mastering of the neces-sities of life in the household was the condition for the freedom in the polis -From remarks like these, it has often been concluded that Arendt in the sense that she would have posited the socio-political structure of the Greek polis as a normative ideal against which modern society, with its conspicuous sured. 11 In other words, her virulent hostility toward what she calls do with life, labour, and reproduction on the political realm, is seen by some as the result of the fact that she made her idiosyncratic understanding of the Greek polis life the standard against which modern society is assessed and, obviously, found wanting.
However, there are also passages in which she seems to endorse the opposite view, namely, that there is nothing that more clearly reveals the anti-political thrust of the Western tradition than its deepcase at the end of the chapter of The Origins of Totalitarianism entitled, "The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of persons in interbellum Europe, Arendt argues that these people found themselves deprived of their human rights at the very moment they most needed them. Both the French and the American proclamations of the Rights of Man presuppose that each human being is endowed with a set of fundamental rights that are "selfstatus as a citizen of the nation-state, it turned out that one could not appeal to these sooften than not these stateless people found themselves reduced to 12 this nakedness was the camp inmate, who was reduced to nothing more than "a specimen of the animal-species Automne ) violent, antidetermined Western politics since its inception. "Ever since the known that highly developed political life breeds…a deep resentment against the disturbing miracle contained in the fact that each of us is kground formed by what is biologically given to us at birth "breaks into the political scene as the alien which in its all too obvious difference reminds us of the limitations of human a "indicates those realms in which man cannot change and cannot act
The Human , Arendt concludes that such a suppression of biological life has to be avoided at all costs:
The human being who has lost his place in a community…is left with those qualities which usually can become articulate only in mere e is, all that which is mysteriously given us by birth and which includes the shape of our bodies and the talents of our minds, can be adequately dealt with only by the unpredictable hazards of friendship and sympathy, or by the great and incalculable grace of love, which says with Augustine, "Volo ut sis without being able to give any particular reason for such supreme It should be clear that such a "basic gratitude for everything that is as and not 13 , is diametrically opposed to what Arendt, apparently approvingly, described as the ancient Greek hierarchy between the biological and politicolinguistic dimensions of man.
How, then, should we conceive the relation between birth and the will this condition fare in the dawning age of biotechnology? Does biological birth really condition the capacity to act, in which case natality to oppose the use of biotechnology, which brings qualities that are given by birth within the reach of planned technical interventi each other, as Arendt also seems to argue, in which case the concept of natality would rather turn into a weapon in the hands of those who believe that our present physical and psychical constitution is an obstacle that impedes the realization of our full potentialities? 14 The fact that Arendt invokes the event of the birth of a child to characterize the emergence of the new inherent in political action should, according to them, be understood from the perspective of the strateovides an age dominated by the worldless animal laborans with an event that discloses the same mode of temporality that structures worldly action. Thus understood, politico-linguistic birth should be seen as the supreme actualization of the potentiality for beginning something new that biological birth only s . i-, in n human creatureliness and freedom. The central aim of this early study was to question the possibility of grounding the precept "Love thy neighbour as the book, Arendt shows that Aug not suitable for this purpose. Since it presupposes that the "highest which lies beyond worldly life and death, this kind of love demands complete self-denial and forsakenness of the human world. Thus, 18 In the chapter entitled 'Creator contain yet another notion of love which is not primarily oriented toward an absolute future, but toward an absolute past: "When happiness is projected into the absolute future, it is guaranteed by a kind of absolute past, since the knowledge of it, which is present in happiness is, and this knowledge "is given in pure consciousness ndt concludes that the only way to reach the idea of happiness is through remembrance: "[S]ince recollection presents a knowledge that necessarily lies ss, toward the origin of human of God that can only be actualized through a return, in recollection, to
The Symbolic Reduction of the Event of Parturition
The creature in its createdness derives its sense of meaning from a source that precedes its creation, that is, from the Maker who made it…. The fact that man has not made himself but was creatArendt c was the zeros--calls the relation between human creatureliness and meaningfulness -that it was also possible for her to develop a theological understanding of natality would also seem to indicate that the biological understanding of natality developed in dition is but one historicon--linguistic action. Yet, if Arendt really intended to say that there is merely a structural, or symbolic analogy bet human being through birth and the emergence of the new through worldly action, just as there is an analogy between divine creation nihilo 19 then why does she, nonetheless, claim that in this politico-linguistic birth the naked also highly questionable that the ancient Greek separation between the realms of necessity and freedom, oikos and polis, and between and bios, underpins ty, if only because she repeatedly insists that natality names a concept that "Greek antiquity ignored altogethity, it has been forcefully argued that the reference to biological birth is not merely a metaphorical gesture, but that she really intends to say that the human capacity to act is conditioned by the bare biological fact of being born. Neither, however, is it an attempt to ground political action in an immutable human nature, as also has been suggested. 20 19 "It is this faith in and hope for the world that found perhaps its most glorious sion in the few words with which the Gospels an- Fürsorge) could help us understand event, but is always already also a politico-linguistic event: "Linguistic natality cannot be laid over physical natality, and this suggests 21 It is imen of the animal-species man who only actualizes her potentiality to become a unique self when she inserts herself into the public 22 In other words, according to Birmingham, the newborn is always immediately e posed to the welcoming address of the other.
politico-linguistic birth are so deeply implicated as to be inseparable, but she retorts that Birmingham still sets too great a distance between the biological and the linguistic components of the event of natality by identifying their moment of convergence with the naming of the newborn. The problem with this understanding of natality, etween the maternal body and the fetus to the pre-social, prelinguistic sphere, thus privileging the paternal moment in the event temporality offers a way out of this impasse. This syncopated temporality refers to "a mode of being in time that can grasp itself only 23 For instance, the moment of my physical birth constitutes a past that was never present to me because I was not "the later point in time. In much the same way, this syncopated temporal structure also determines our politico-linguistic birth. The outcome lf to the backward glance ction between both kinds of births shows itself by the fact that our politico-linguistic birth always arrives too late, in the sense that our constitutes an absolute past which necessarily remains outside our 21 idea that in ontogenetic development humans go through the distinct stages that determined the phylogenetic evolution of their direct etermine the ontogenetic development of animal species, but that it cannot provide an answer to the much more pressing riddle of human ontogentic development. Bolk departs from the often quoted, but never quite satisfactorily e plained, observation that adult humans strongly resemble juvenile pongids-a phenotypic likeness that gradually disappears during the in pongids there is a strong negative allometry of the brain and a strong positive allometry of the jaws. According to Bolk, these phe- theory holds that, in contrast to animals, humans evolved by retaining a number of juvenile and even fetal features of their direct ancestors throughout ontogenesis. Whereas in the ontogenetic development of nonction of body hair, and high relative brain weight represent only temporary features, in humans they have evolved to become permanent features of their physical constitution.
There is no direct evidence that Arendt ever engaged in a thorplausible that one implication in particular could have drawn her attention wh iretardation of human ontogenetic development, itself caused by an alteration of the endocrine system. In other words, it is because maturation is delayed in humans that fetal growth rates are prolonged and fetal features longer than other primates and mammals of comparable body size. A more interesting implication, however, is that if humans were to attain the same level of ontogenetic development as other primates at their time of birth, they would actually need a gestation period of twenty-one months instead of nine months. In a sense, as the Swiss biologist Adolf Portmann noted, one could say that humans spend 26 The main reason for this acceleration of time of birth is that the human brain continues to grow at fetal rates even at this stage of ontogenetic development. Humans achieve only twenty-three per cent of their full brain capacity at term, whereas the brains of other mammals are at that time already fully formed. But if this brain development were to take place in utero, then it would be physically impossible for a woman to give birth.
(Mängelwesen inspired her to develop the concept of natality on the basis of a similar anthropological theory. Unlike animals, Gehlen argues, humans are born without any well-developed instincts and specialized refore,
Gehlen rejects the standard interpretation of the evolutionary theory of the origin of man. According to him, humans are not so much superior to other animal species, but are, on the contrary, vastly y as animal only to discover that he makes an imperfect and indeed impossible ani-27 Thus, when Arendt states in the mentioned footnote to Gehthat action and speech are a "'biologica for illshe clearly inscribes herself in a peculiarly German tradieanimals. Whereas newborn animals are almost immediately capable of generating appropriate reactions to the stimuli that emerge out of -adapted to the environment into which they are thrown. Born prematurely, no spontaneous attunement between the human organism and the environment takes place. For this reason, humans enter the world in desperate need of protection and care by the social group. According to Portmann, one can even argue that the social group assumes the task ation allows us to understand more clearly why Arendt can argue that -linguistic event: as premature creatures, humans are biologically conditioned to engage in politico-linguistic action. As Gehlen puts it, "a being with such a 28 Thus, when Arendt writes that "a life without speech and without action…has This makes it understandable why Arendt can argue that the concept of natality articulates the idea that human freedom is conditioned by the biological fact of being born without necessarily contradicting herself. Natality not only articulates the fact that our politico-linguistic birth always arrives too late sense that our biological birth constitutes a past that was never present to us. The concept of natality also articulates the fact that our biological birth always arrives , in the sense that our premature birth releases us from the fate of being compelled to follow a biogenetically predetermined course of life. This is also one of the reasons why Arendt rejects the notion of human nature and opts to 27 Gehlen, Man speak about human conditions instead. 29 Natality, as a condition of because the biological traits they are born with never solidify into a git nnings. Accordingly, natality, is neither a purely biological concept, nor a purely politico-linguistic one. It names an event which breaks out of the eternal circle of nature, "where no beginning and no end biological condition from which it emerged.
As Michael Sandel notes, the freedom of natal beings consists in a 30 However, the foregoing suggests that very little has been given to such beings at birth. Departicular environment, humans are biologically conditioned to e. Arendt writes:
In addition to the conditions under which life is given to man on earth, and partly out of them, men constantly create their own self-made conditions, which, their human origin and their variability notwithstanding, possess the same conditioning power as natural things. Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the character of a Furthermore, Arendt makes it utterly clear that the condition of natality not only prompts human beings to engage in politicolinguistic action. Natality also prompts them to engage in technological innovation:
being for whom everything, given or man-made, immediately behimself to an environment of machines the moment he designed them. They certainly have become as inalienable a condition of ious ages.
29 " [T] he human condition is not the same as human nature, and the sum total of human activities and capabilities which correspond to the human condition does -30 Sandel, T
